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Amazon.com, Inc. OFAC Settlement: $134.5K (2020)

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Amazon.com, Inc., a company that provides retail, e-commerce, and digital services to millions of customers worldwide, settled its potential civil liability for apparent violations of multiple OFAC sanctions programs, agreeing to pay $134,523. As a result of deficiencies related to Amazon's sanctions screening processes, Amazon provided goods and services to persons sanctioned by OFAC; to persons located in the sanctioned region or countries of Crimea, Iran, and Syria; and to individuals located in or employed by the foreign missions of countries sanctioned by OFAC. Amazon also failed to timely report several hundred transactions conducted pursuant to a general license issued by OFAC that included a mandatory reporting requirement, thereby nullifying that authorization with respect to those transactions.

Penalty Amount

$134,523.00

Enforcement Date

July 8, 2020

Rank in Top Penalties

#218

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Amazon.com, Inc.
Country:
🇺🇸 United States
Industry:
Retail & Luxury
Address:
Seattle, Washington
Penalty amount:
$134,523.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$134,523.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$1,038,206,212.00
Egregious case:
No
Voluntary self disclosure:
Yes
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
November 15, 2011 to October 18, 2018
Program:
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (CACR)Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 547 (DRCSR)Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 598 (FNKSR)Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594 (GTSR)Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (ITSR)Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 536 (NTSR)North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 510 (NKSR)Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 542 (SySR)Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538 (SSR)Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 590 (TCOSR)Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 591 (VSR)Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 539 (WMDPSR)Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 541 (ZSR)
Enforcement date:
July 8, 2020

Nature of the Apparent Violations

From on or about November 15, 2011, to on or about October 18, 2018, persons located in Crimea, Iran, and Syria placed orders or otherwise conducted business on Amazon's websites for consumer and retail goods and services where the transaction details demonstrated that the goods or services would be provided to persons in those jurisdictions. Amazon also accepted and processed orders on its websites for persons located in or employed by the foreign missions of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

Additionally, Amazon accepted and processed orders from persons listed on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (the "SDN List") who were blocked pursuant to the Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, the Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Regulations, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations, the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, the Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations. The apparent violations consisted primarily of transactions involving low-value retail goods and services, with a total transaction value of approximately $269,000.

These apparent violations occurred primarily because Amazon's automated sanctions screening processes failed to fully analyze all transaction and customer data relevant to compliance with OFAC's sanctions regulations. In some instances, orders specifically referenced a sanctioned jurisdiction, a city within a sanctioned jurisdiction, or a common alternative spelling of a sanctioned jurisdiction, yet Amazon's screening processes did not flag the transactions for review. For example, Amazon's screening processes did not flag orders with address fields containing an address in "Yalta, Krimea" for the term "Yalta," a city in Crimea, nor for the variation of the spelling of Crimea. Amazon also failed to interdict or otherwise flag orders shipped to the Embassy of Iran located in third countries. Moreover, in several hundred instances, Amazon's automated screening processes failed to flag the correctly spelled names and addresses of persons on OFAC's SDN List.

The conduct resulted in apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (CACR); the Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 547 (DRCSR); the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 598 (FNKSR); the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594 (GTSR); the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (ITSR); the Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 536 (NTSR); the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 510 (NKSR); the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 542 (SySR); the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538 (SSR); the Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 590 (TCOSR); Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014; the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 591 (VSR); the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 539 (WMDPSR); and the Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 541 (ZSR).

Amazon also disclosed to OFAC that it failed to timely report 362 transactions involving Crimea conducted pursuant to General License No. 5 (GL 5), which authorized certain transactions prohibited by E.O. 13685 through February 1, 2015, subject to a requirement that transactions be reported within 10 days after wind-down activities concluded. Amazon had previously reported 245 such transactions on February 13, 2015 within the required period, but did not report the additional 362 transactions until well after the deadline had expired. As a result, the authorization in GL 5 is nullified with respect to those 362 transactions.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty amount for the apparent violations was $1,038,206,212. OFAC determined that Amazon voluntarily self-disclosed the apparent violations and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. Part 501, app. A., the base civil monetary penalty amount equals the sum of one-half of the transaction value for each apparent violation, which in this case is $134,523. The settlement amount of $134,523 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • Amazon failed to exercise due caution or care when it implemented sanctions screening processes that failed to properly flag transactions involving blocked persons and sanctioned jurisdictions. In particular, Amazon did not properly review or assess addresses, customer names, or common variations of such data as part of its sanctions screening.
  • While the apparent violations primarily involved the provision of low-value retail and consumer goods and services, some of the apparent violations related to Amazon's processing of orders for personal security products on behalf of persons located at the Iranian embassies in Tokyo, Japan, and in Brussels, Belgium.
  • Amazon provides consumer goods and services via its e-commerce websites and processes billions of global transactions annually, and is one of the largest and most commercially sophisticated companies in the world.

Mitigating Factors

  • Amazon had not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations.
  • Amazon voluntarily self-disclosed the apparent violations to OFAC, cooperated with OFAC's investigation by providing data analysis of the apparent violations and submitting detailed information in a well-organized manner, and entered into tolling agreements with OFAC. In addition, Amazon conducted an internal investigation without receiving an administrative subpoena and identified and disclosed the circumstances of the transactions that led to the apparent violations.
  • Upon discovering the apparent violations, Amazon undertook significant remedial measures to address its sanctions screening deficiencies and agreed as part of its settlement to undertake various additional sanctions compliance commitments. These include: investing substantial resources to improve its overall sanctions compliance program, actively engaging senior management on compliance improvements, adding significant headcount to its compliance teams, and increasing the frequency of its sanctions compliance reviews; employing internal and third-party sources to conduct a thorough review of its sanctions compliance program and automated screening systems and incorporating additional automated preventative screening controls designed to scale and operate effectively for its retail business; developing internally custom screening lists to minimize the risk of processing transactions that raise sanctions compliance concerns; enhancing sanctioned jurisdiction IP blocking controls and implementing automated processes to update continually its mapping of IP ranges associated with sanctioned jurisdictions; bolstering compliance training programs by providing training tailored to the roles of specific teams and specialized ad-hoc training to personnel responsible for sanctions and export control compliance; and expanding the use of specific export control and sanctions provisions and the language of those provisions in its agreements.

Compliance Takeaways

This case demonstrates the importance of implementing and maintaining effective, risk-based sanctions compliance controls, including sanctions screening measures appropriate for e-commerce and other internet-based businesses that operate on a global scale. Such large and sophisticated businesses should implement and employ compliance tools and programs that are commensurate with the speed and scale of their business operations. In particular, global companies that rely heavily on automated sanctions screening processes should take reasonable, risk-based steps to ensure that their processes are appropriately configured to screen relevant customer information and to capture data quality issues, such as common misspellings. Routine testing of these processes to ensure effectiveness and identify deficiencies may also be appropriate. Moreover, companies that learn of a weakness in their internal compliance controls may benefit by taking immediate and effective action, to the extent possible, to identify and implement compensating controls until the root cause of the weakness can be determined and remediated.

This case also demonstrates the importance of compliance with all aspects of the terms of OFAC's general licenses, including the timely fulfillment of any reporting obligations pursuant to those licenses.

Official Source Documents

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Archived on June 13, 2026

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