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Poloniex, LLC OFAC Settlement: $7.6M (2023)

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Poloniex, LLC, a Delaware company that operated an online trading and settlement platform, settled with OFAC for $7,591,630 to resolve 65,942 apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs. Between January 2014 and November 2019, the Poloniex trading platform allowed customers apparently located in sanctioned jurisdictions to engage in online digital asset-related transactions—consisting of trades, deposits, and withdrawals—with a combined value of $15,335,349, despite having reason to know their location based on both Know Your Customer information and internet protocol address data. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were not egregious.

Penalty Amount

$7,591,630.00

Enforcement Date

May 1, 2023

Rank in Top Penalties

#45

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Poloniex, LLC
Country:
🇺🇸 United States
Industry:
Crypto
Address:
Boston, Massachusetts
Penalty amount:
$7,591,630.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$99,237,000.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$19,692,872,800.00
Egregious case:
No
Apparent violations:
65942
Voluntary self disclosure:
No
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
July 28, 2015 to September 2, 2019
Program:
section 1(a)(iii) of Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine"Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538.205Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 542.207
Enforcement date:
May 1, 2023

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Poloniex operations began in January 2014 by offering an online digital assets trading and settlement platform that allowed customers to fund their accounts and conduct trading activity. Sixteen months later, in May 2015, Poloniex implemented a sanctions compliance program providing for a review of KYC information for new customers in jurisdictions subject to comprehensive OFAC sanctions; existing customers were not retroactively screened in this manner. As a result, customers who had self-identified before May 2015 as residing in a sanctioned jurisdiction were generally able to continue using the platform.

Poloniex began monitoring IP address data in May 2015 to detect logins from sanctioned jurisdictions and conducted additional diligence on such logins, including contacting account owners, but did not begin implementing a block on such IP addresses until June 2017. Sanctions controls related to customers in the Crimea region of Ukraine were implemented only in August 2017.

Circle Internet Financial Limited acquired Poloniex in February 2018 and implemented additional internal sanctions compliance controls that significantly reduced the rate of additional Apparent Violations. Some Apparent Violations, primarily related to a small number of accounts opened by persons then located in Crimea, continued in 2018 and 2019.

As a result of these compliance deficiencies, between approximately July 28, 2015 and September 2, 2019, Poloniex processed 65,942 online digital asset-related transactions with a combined value of approximately $15,335,349 for 232 customers apparently located in sanctioned jurisdictions, predominantly in Crimea, but also in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. These comprised: 57,263 apparent violations of section 1(a)(iii) of Executive Order 13685 (Crimea); 3,784 apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201; 1,466 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204; 3,428 apparent violations of the now-repealed Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538.205; and one apparent violation of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 542.207.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $19,692,872,800. OFAC determined that the Apparent Violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, the base civil monetary penalty amount equals the applicable schedule amount of $99,237,000. The settlement amount of $7,591,630 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • Poloniex failed to exercise due caution or care for its sanctions compliance obligations when it operated with no sanctions compliance program for more than a year (January 2014 to May 2015) after beginning to offer digital asset services worldwide. Even when it implemented a sanctions compliance program, Poloniex did not apply it consistently across sanctioned jurisdictions nor to pre-existing accounts.
  • Poloniex had reason to know that the users involved in the Apparent Violations were located in sanctioned jurisdictions based on those users' physical address data and IP address data.
  • Poloniex conveyed economic benefit to 232 persons in several jurisdictions subject to OFAC sanctions, and thereby harmed the integrity of multiple OFAC sanctions programs.

Mitigating Factors

  • Neither Poloniex nor Circle has received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the earliest transaction giving rise to the Apparent Violations.
  • Poloniex was a small start-up at the time of most of the Apparent Violations.
  • After Circle acquired the Poloniex Trading Platform in early 2018, and before OFAC began its investigation, Circle implemented its own compliance measures for the Poloniex Trading Platform, which further improved Poloniex's sanctions compliance program. Those measures, in addition to other subsequent remedial measures, included: freezing users' accounts until KYC verification was completed; implementing an automated review and verification tool for identity documents; implementing a protocol that prevented users from activating an account if the profile information matched a sanctioned country; implementing geolocation restrictions with respect to Syria, Iran, Cuba, Sudan, and North Korea; closing any accounts that listed "Crimea" in the profile information, and identification and blocking of IP ranges associated with certain internet service providers operating in Crimea; creating a "Crimea IP blacklist" and "Crimean city/region keywords list" against which all account information was screened; and enhancing its training program and hiring additional experienced compliance personnel.
  • Poloniex and Circle provided substantial cooperation in connection with OFAC's investigation into the Apparent Violations.
  • Due to the specific characteristics of how the Poloniex Trading Platform's internal system processed a customer's orders to trade in online digital assets, many individual transactions were for a relatively small amount (including some for less than $1). Moreover, the volume of Apparent Violations represented a very small percentage of the total volume of transactions on the Poloniex Trading Platform annually.

Compliance Takeaways

Online digital asset companies, like all financial service providers, are responsible for ensuring that they do not engage in transactions prohibited by OFAC sanctions, such as providing services to persons in comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions. To mitigate such risks, online digital asset companies should develop a tailored, risk-based sanctions compliance program. An appropriate compliance program will depend on a variety of factors, including the type of business involved, its size and sophistication, products and services offered, customers and counterparties, and geographic locations served. It should incorporate five essential components of compliance: (1) management commitment; (2) risk assessment; (3) internal controls; (4) testing and auditing; and (5) training.

This enforcement action emphasizes the importance for new companies and those involved in emerging technologies to incorporate sanctions compliance into their business functions at the outset, especially when the companies seek to offer financial services to a global customer base. It also highlights the importance of using all available location-related information for sanctions compliance purposes and integrating such information into a risk-based sanctions compliance program to mitigate the risk of providing services to persons in sanctioned jurisdictions. Companies implementing new compliance controls should also ensure that they apply those controls not only to new customers, but to existing ones as well.

Official Source Documents

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Archived on June 13, 2026

SHA-256: cde63c0ea255e3bb91b564e2cacd67b0faffeb6b85edf17614e833b53fce98e4

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