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Privilege Underwriters OFAC Settlement: $466.2K (2023)

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Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange (PURE), an insurance organization that primarily offers insurance policies and coverages for luxury homes, automobiles, art collections, jewelry, and watercraft, settled with OFAC for $466,200 to resolve 39 apparent violations of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations. Between May 2018 and July 2020, PURE engaged in transactions related to four insurance policies involving a blocked Panama-based company owned by Specially Designated National Viktor Vekselberg. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that PURE's apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious.

Penalty Amount

$466,200.00

Enforcement Date

December 21, 2023

Rank in Top Penalties

#144

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange
Country:
๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ United States
Industry:
Insurance
Address:
White Plains, New York
Penalty amount:
$466,200.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$666,000.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$13,906,581.00
Egregious case:
No
Apparent violations:
39
Voluntary self disclosure:
No
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
May 1, 2018 to July 24, 2020
Program:
Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. ยง 589.201(a)(4)(iii)
Enforcement date:
December 21, 2023

Nature of the Apparent Violations

In 2010, PURE issued four policies to Medallion, Inc. (Medallion) of Panama: a private fleet auto insurance policy, a jewelry and art insurance policy, and two high-value homeowners insurance policies. The policies were renewed annually thereafter. Email correspondence from January 2010 demonstrates that PURE's Underwriting Manager was aware the policies provided coverage for Viktor Vekselberg's property. Vekselberg was also identified as Medallion's sole shareholder on a February 24, 2010 response to a form questionnaire PURE used to confirm that the insured properties were not used for commercial purposes. At the time the four policies were issued, neither Medallion nor Vekselberg was subject to U.S. sanctions.

On April 6, 2018, OFAC added Vekselberg to the SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13662. Under OFAC's 50 Percent Rule, Medallion became a blocked person on that date. PURE's underwriters had failed to upload the shareholder information from the corporate disclosure statement into PURE's underwriting systems where corporate ownership information is stored. Further, at the time Medallion was onboarded in 2010, there was no requirement for prospective non-U.S. policyholders to be escalated for review and approval by PURE's management and compliance staff.

Between May 1, 2018 and July 24, 2020, PURE collected 38 premium payments totaling $308,391 for the four policies. PURE also paid a $7,500 claim related to one of the policies on July 22, 2020. In total, PURE engaged in 39 transactions totaling $315,891 with a blocked person, apparently violating the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. ยง 589.201(a)(4)(iii).

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $13,906,581. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious. Under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, the base civil monetary penalty equals the applicable schedule amount, which in this case is $666,000. The settlement amount of $466,200 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • PURE failed to exercise due caution or care for its sanctions compliance obligations when it did not ensure ownership information about a customer was incorporated into its sanctions screening program. Even after relevant sanctions expanded and OFAC published its guidance on the 50 Percent Rule in 2014, PURE took no subsequent due diligence or other measures to identify this gap until it received a government inquiry in 2022. This resulted in PURE's providing services to a blocked person for more than two years.
  • PURE had reason to know it was receiving premium payments from and providing coverage to, and thus dealing with, a blocked person. In 2010, Medallion's ownership information was provided to PURE. PURE should have understood the connection between its customer and the customer's designated owner.
  • PURE paid a $7,500 claim to a blocked person, and for more than two years provided insurance coverage to and collected 38 premium payments totaling $308,390 on behalf of a blocked person, thereby providing an economic benefit to a sanctioned person.

Mitigating Factors

  • OFAC has not issued a Finding of Violation or Penalty against PURE in the five years preceding the first apparent violation noted herein.
  • PURE undertook several remedial measures, including screening its entire customer base through two third-party vendor tools, and requiring its underwriting department to upload all potential or existing customers' corporate disclosure statements into PURE's system and escalate any applications involving a non-U.S. entity for review and approval by PURE's management and compliance staff.
  • PURE cooperated with OFAC's investigation by providing information and timely responses to OFAC. PURE also signed a tolling agreement.

Compliance Takeaways

This case demonstrates the importance of implementing and maintaining effective, risk-based sanctions compliance controls. Such controls should capture and incorporate all relevant available information to conduct responsive and regular screening, including risk-based steps to comply with OFAC's 50 Percent Rule and to account for changes to applicable sanctions. Such changes, including updates to OFAC's SDN List, can occur regularly.

As sanctions programs are updated, companies should continually reassess their risk in light of their customer profile, lines of business, and other criteria. A risk assessment should generally inform the extent of the due diligence efforts at various points in a relationship or in a transaction. Controls that were adequate at one point in time may not remain sufficient when new sanctions are imposed or existing sanctions are modified.

Official Source Documents

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Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

SHA-256: 773f46d83151054912f5665d5613cfe15b0f68ad842a2023b3e3cf6d084518a6

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