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Toll Holdings Limited OFAC Settlement: $6.1M (2022)

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Toll Holdings Limited, an international freight forwarding and logistics company headquartered in Australia, settled with OFAC for $6,131,855 to resolve 2,958 apparent violations of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations. The apparent violations occurred when Toll originated or received payments through the U.S. financial system involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons in connection with sea, air, and rail shipments conducted by Toll, its affiliates, or suppliers to, from, or through the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, or Syria, or the property or interests in property of an entity on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

Penalty Amount

$6,131,855.00

Enforcement Date

April 25, 2022

Rank in Top Penalties

#48

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Toll Holdings Limited
Country:
🇦🇺 Australia
Industry:
Logistics
Address:
Melbourne, Australia
Penalty amount:
$6,131,855.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$15,329,638.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$826,431,378.00
Egregious case:
No
Apparent violations:
2958
Voluntary self disclosure:
Yes
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
January 2013 to February 2019
Program:
North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 510Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 542Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
Enforcement date:
April 25, 2022

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Between approximately January 2013 and February 2019, Toll originated or caused to be received 2,958 payments totaling approximately $48,409,909 in connection with shipments conducted by Toll, its affiliates, or providers and suppliers to, from, or through the DPRK, Iran, or Syria, and/or involving property or interests in property of SDN-listed entities. These payments were processed through at least four U.S. financial institutions or foreign branches of U.S.-incorporated financial institutions, involving 23 different Toll entities across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America.

Of the 2,958 payments, 424 involved Mahan Airlines, designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 (327 transactions), or Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines Company, designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 (97 transactions). The remaining 2,534 funds transfers were payments for shipments to, from, or transshipping through the DPRK, Iran, or Syria.

Toll failed to adopt or implement policies and controls that prevented it from conducting transactions involving designated parties or persons in sanctioned jurisdictions. This failure resulted in part from Toll's rapid expansion without a requisite increase in compliance resources. Beginning in 2007, Toll began acquiring small, local, or regional freight forwarding companies; by 2017, it had almost 600 invoicing, data, payment, and other system applications spread across its various business units.

By or before May 2015, some Toll personnel knew or had reason to know that the subject payments were in potential violation of U.S. sanctions prohibitions. That month, after one of Toll's banks restricted a Toll subsidiary's U.S. dollar account following identification of a Syria-related transaction, a Toll headquarters treasury employee sent an email instructing UAE and South Korea affiliates to avoid including the names of sanctioned jurisdictions on invoices going forward. The bank continued to raise concerns, and in June 2016 threatened to terminate its relationship with Toll after evaluating Toll's controls and deeming them unacceptable.

Although Toll decided in June 2016 to cease all business with U.S.-sanctioned countries, it did not implement compliance policies and procedures sufficient to prevent payments involving sanctioned persons through the U.S. financial system. In February 2017, Toll introduced "hard controls" that disabled country and location codes for ports and cities in sanctioned countries in its freight management system; 2,853 of the 2,958 payments had already occurred before those controls were implemented.

The apparent violations encompassed § 510.212 of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 510; § 542.205 of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 542; § 560.203 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560; § 544.201 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 544; and § 594.201 of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $826,431,378. OFAC determined that Toll voluntarily self-disclosed the Apparent Violations and that the Apparent Violations constitute a non-egregious case. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. Part 501, app. A, the base civil monetary penalty is $15,329,638, equaling one-half the transaction value for each apparent violation, capped at the lesser of $125,000 for transactions on or before November 2, 2015, and $153,961 for transactions after November 2, 2015, or one-half of the applicable statutory maximum, per each apparent violation. The settlement amount of $6,131,855 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • Toll acted with reckless disregard for U.S. economic sanctions laws when, over the period of six years, it caused at least 2,958 payments involving shipments from, to, or through sanctioned jurisdictions or the blocked property or an interest in blocked property of entities on the SDN List to be routed through U.S. financial institutions. Toll's pattern of conduct occurred despite an existing company compliance policy to abide by all applicable sanctions laws, and despite multiple warnings from a U.S. financial institution regarding Toll's sanctions compliance risks.
  • Toll knew or had reason to know of the apparent violations, including as a result of concerns raised by Toll's bank and Toll's business practice of transacting with U.S.-sanctioned persons and its use of the U.S. financial system.
  • Approximately 14 percent of the apparent violations were for transactions involving entities blocked by OFAC for terrorism or WMD concerns. Toll's activities also facilitated the participation of persons in comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions in international shipments and business, contrary to U.S. policy objectives.
  • Toll is a commercially sophisticated company and a major global freight forwarder. Its operations at the time of the apparent violations involved a network of approximately 1,200 agents, franchises, offices, and affiliates, procuring and providing commercial freight services worldwide.
  • Upon first learning in May 2015 of problematic transactions and its initial engagement with the Bank, Toll did not take immediate or adequate steps to address and stop its processing of transactions with sanctioned interests through the U.S. financial system.

Mitigating Factors

  • Toll has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the Apparent Violations.
  • Toll voluntarily self-disclosed the apparent violations to OFAC and cooperated with OFAC's investigation by conducting a thorough forensic analysis of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations and submitting detailed information in a well-organized manner, as well as engaging responsively in answering requests for additional information.
  • Toll ultimately took extensive actions to remedy its compliance gaps, including: conducting a risk-mapping exercise to identify the root causes of the compliance lapses and instituting appropriate remedial measures and targeted controls; developing and implementing an audit plan that has resulted in recommendations and further implementation of changes to its remediation efforts; restructuring its compliance division to address procedural issues and streamline approaches to sanctions screening, and granting elevated sanctions-related responsibilities to its most senior compliance executive; implementing a sanctions compliance training program for all relevant employees, training more than 500 employees across five countries; implementing "hard controls" within its freight management system that disabled the ability to book shipments involving sanctioned jurisdictions; applying its sanctions compliance standards to anyone acting on behalf of Toll, including but not limited to Toll's representatives, consultants, agents, brokers, and subcontractors; risk-based screening of transactions, third parties, and agents against its internal sanctions lists, to include the SDN List as well as other less-restricted parties lists; and ending all franchise relationships as part of a broader risk-mitigation strategy, and introducing enhanced due diligence measures for on-boarding agents, as well as instituting a due diligence screening process where all third parties adhere to the same compliance standards as Toll.

Compliance Takeaways

This enforcement action highlights the importance of instituting strong internal controls and procedures to govern payments involving affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, or other counterparties when any of them conduct business with sanctioned jurisdictions or persons. Complex payment and invoicing arrangements, while normal business conduct, can pose sanctions risks when linkages to sanctioned jurisdictions or persons are obscured, or when mechanisms to preclude their involvement with U.S. financial institutions are absent or not implemented effectively.

Entities should respond promptly and fully to address compliance weaknesses when issues first arise, identify their full extent and causes, and implement necessary changes to their compliance programs, practices, and procedures. These changes should reflect the specific gaps identified with respect to the applicable sanctions restrictions. Reminders of established compliance policies alone may not result in concrete changes to conduct that poses risks of apparent violations.

This action further emphasizes the need for entities to identify and implement measures to mitigate sanctions risks when merging with or acquiring other enterprises. The need for such efforts can be particularly acute when expanding rapidly, including when disparate information technology systems and databases are being integrated across multiple entities. In such cases, the need to adequately resource compliance functions, including compliance personnel and sanctions-related technology and systems, is especially important.

In addition, this case illustrates the care non-U.S. persons should take to avoid prohibited transactions involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons when their activities rely on the use of U.S. financial institutions or otherwise involve U.S. persons or a U.S. nexus. Non-U.S. persons that seek to conduct business involving U.S. persons or the United States, including processing transactions through the U.S. financial system, should ensure their compliance policies contain measures to prevent violative dealings with sanctioned persons or jurisdictions.

Official Source Documents

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Archived on June 13, 2026

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