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Uphold HQ Inc. OFAC Settlement: $72.2K (2023)

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Uphold HQ Inc., a money services business, settled with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for $72,230.32 to resolve its potential civil liability for apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs. Between March 2017 and May 2022, Uphold or its affiliates processed 152 transactions totaling $180,575.80 in apparent violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, and the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations. OFAC determined that Uphold's apparent violations were non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.

Penalty Amount

$72,230.32

Enforcement Date

March 31, 2023

Rank in Top Penalties

#264

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Uphold HQ Inc.
Country:
🇺🇸 United States
Industry:
Crypto
Address:
Larkspur, California
Penalty amount:
$72,230.32
Base civil monetary penalty:
$90,288.90
Max civil monetary penalty:
$44,468,494.00
Egregious case:
No
Apparent violations:
69
Voluntary self disclosure:
Yes
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
March 2017 to May 2022
Program:
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204, 560.206, and 560.215Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201E.O. 13884 and the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 591.201
Enforcement date:
March 31, 2023

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Uphold is a global multi-asset digital trading platform founded in 2014 that allows customers to move, convert, and hold currency (traditional and virtual) or commodities to enable foreign exchange and cross-border remittances.

Between March 2017 and May 2022, Uphold or certain of its non-U.S. affiliates maintained accounts for customers who provided information during account onboarding indicating their location in Iran or Cuba. In some cases, customers selected a non-sanctioned country from a drop-down menu but indicated their location in a sanctioned jurisdiction in a free text address field, which Uphold did not screen for sanctions compliance. In other cases, customers provided an identification document from a sanctioned jurisdiction, which Uphold also did not screen or flag. As a result, Uphold or its affiliates processed 53 transactions totaling $22,870.02 for customers who self-identified as being located in Iran, 16 transactions with an Iranian virtual currency exchange totaling $13,705.50, and 25 transactions totaling $142,683.74 for customers who self-identified as being located in Cuba. This conduct resulted in 69 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204, 560.206, and 560.215, and 25 apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201.

Between August 9, 2019 and October 19, 2020, Uphold processed 58 transactions totaling $1,316.54 on behalf of two customers who self-identified during enhanced customer diligence as employees of government-owned Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA), in apparent violation of Executive Order 13884 and the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 591.201. E.O. 13884, issued on August 5, 2019, blocked the property and interests in property of the Government of Venezuela (GoV), including any person owned or controlled by the GoV and any person acting on behalf of such entities. In the fall of 2021, Uphold began collecting enhanced customer diligence information that included employment information from customers meeting certain predefined criteria, but did not use this information to ensure compliance with E.O. 13884 until May 2022.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $44,468,494. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and non-egregious. Under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, the base civil monetary penalty equals the sum of one-half of the transaction value for each apparent violation, which is $90,288.90. The settlement amount of $72,230.32 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • Uphold and its affiliates failed to exercise due caution or care when it onboarded or conducted diligence on customers who provided information indicating sanctions risks, such as being located in a sanctioned jurisdiction or being an employee of the GoV, and implemented inadequate screening and other compliance processes to identify, analyze, and address these risks.
  • Based on information provided by users to Uphold when opening accounts, Uphold or its affiliates had reason to know it was processing payments on behalf of persons in Iran and Cuba, and employees of the GoV.

Mitigating Factors

  • OFAC has not issued a Penalty Notice or Finding of Violation to Uphold in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the Apparent Violations.
  • Uphold cooperated with OFAC's investigation into the Apparent Violations by responding timely to requests from OFAC, providing well-organized and detailed documentation and spreadsheets, and by entering into a tolling agreement with OFAC.
  • Uphold undertook numerous remedial measures in response to the Apparent Violations, including: suspension of account access to all of the users described above; implementation of an information technology solution to screen customer information provided in free text fields and identification documents; weekly quality assurance testing of screening systems; independent testing of screening systems; implementation of automatic restrictions applicable to users who attempt to send transfers to beneficiaries in sanctioned jurisdictions; real-time virtual currency wallet address screening; additional and enhanced sanctions training to all staff; increased compliance department resources in line with growth of the business; and implementation of periodic sanctions risk assessments.

Compliance Takeaways

This case underscores the importance of financial institutions, including those that provide services related to virtual and traditional currencies, maintaining robust controls to screen information provided by customers to identify sanctions risks. In particular, information provided by customers during the account opening and diligence processes, such as identification and location information, should be considered for screening. Financial institutions should also consider ways to address the potential for customers to circumvent such screening controls.

With respect to Venezuela-related transactions, OFAC noted in Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 680 that it expects financial institutions to conduct due diligence on their own direct customers to confirm that those customers are not persons whose property and interests in property are blocked, such as employees of the GoV, including state-owned entities.

Official Source Documents

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Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

SHA-256: ce25d0122af375f77f743e12815b040fa296fb0cf05459681e0f5d48673ad8b5

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