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Binance Holdings, Ltd. OFAC Settlement: $968.6M (2023)

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Binance Holdings, Ltd., a Cayman Islands virtual currency exchange, settled with OFAC for $968,618,825 to resolve its potential civil liability for 1,667,153 apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs administered by OFAC. Between August 2017 and October 2022, Binance matched and executed virtual currency trades on its online exchange platform between U.S. person users and users in sanctioned jurisdictions or blocked persons, resulting in apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and that Binance's conduct was egregious.

Penalty Amount

$968,618,825.00

Enforcement Date

November 21, 2023

Rank in Top Penalties

#1

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Binance Holdings, Ltd.
Country:
🇰🇾 Cayman Islands
Industry:
Crypto
Address:
Cayman Islands
Penalty amount:
$968,618,825.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$592,133,829,398.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$592,133,829,398.00
Egregious case:
Yes
Apparent violations:
1667153
Voluntary self disclosure:
No
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
August 2017 to October 2022
Program:
Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR)Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 542Executive Order ("E.O.") 13722 of March 15, 2016, North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 510E.O. 13685 of December 19, 2014, Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 589Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515E.O. 14065 of February 21, 2022
Enforcement date:
November 21, 2023

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Binance's algorithmic matching engines ingested incoming buy/sell orders and matched them with pending orders on Binance's orderbook solely according to price and time, without regard to user location. Although Binance developed compliance policies and publicly issued Terms of Use stating that it prohibited business with sanctioned countries, senior management deliberately chose not to enforce these controls. Numerous internal communications demonstrate that the compliance program was intentionally maintained as a "paper program."

In September 2018, the then Deputy Head of Compliance noted that "[the CEO] keeps saying that compliance is here to make Binance APPEAR COMPLIANT." The then CCO explained that Terms of Use restrictions "has to be there to protect us, [it is] protective language. In biz, ceo doesn't want to enforce." In October 2018, the then CCO informed the CEO that Binance had users from sanctioned countries on Binance.com, warning of "downside risk" if FinCEN or OFAC obtained concrete evidence.

After launching Binance.US in September 2019 to nominally redirect U.S. users, Binance continued to retain high-volume and liquidity-providing U.S. users on Binance.com. The CEO directed that popup notices for U.S. users be worded carefully "so that we let people know what they need to do, including using a VPN, without explicitly stating it." As late as July 2020, the then CCO stated that high-volume U.S. users could trade on Binance.com "on an exceptional basis." Binance also continued to allow trades by users logged in from a sanctioned jurisdiction IP address so long as they had submitted KYC documents from a non-sanctioned jurisdiction.

Between approximately August 2017 and October 2022, Binance processed 1,667,153 virtual currency transactions totaling approximately $706,068,127 in apparent violation of § 560.204 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560; § 542.207 of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 542; §§ 3(a) and 7(a) of E.O. 13722 and §§ 510.206 and 510.212 of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 510; §§ 1(a)(iii) and 3(a) of E.O. 13685 and §§ 589.207 and 589.213 of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 589; § 515.201 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515; §§ 1(a)(iii) and 4(a) of E.O. 14065; and Section 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. Binance identified the sanctioned jurisdiction users as located in Iran, Syria, North Korea, the Crimea Region of Ukraine, Cuba, the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, and the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The maximum statutory penalty amount in this case is $592,133,829,398. OFAC determined that the Apparent Violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were egregious. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A, the base penalty for the Apparent Violations equals the statutory maximum.

The settlement amount of $968,618,825 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines, Binance's agreement to retain an Independent Compliance Monitor for a five-year term, and Binance's concurrent settlements with DOJ, FinCEN, and the CFTC. Of the total settlement amount, $898,618,825 shall be deemed satisfied by Binance's payment to DOJ for ITSR violations arising out of the same pattern of conduct during the same period of time. The Settlement Agreement also provides that if OFAC determines a material breach of, or misrepresentation in, the agreement has occurred, OFAC may seek to impose an additional penalty up to the statutory maximum.

Aggravating Factors

  • Binance knew that its conduct constituted, or likely constituted, a violation of U.S. law when it intentionally retained both sanctioned jurisdiction users and U.S. users on its platform while understanding the applicability of U.S. sanctions to trades in which Binance matched U.S. and sanctioned jurisdiction users as counterparties. Binance's knowledge is reflected in the statements of senior executives at the highest levels of the company, including the CEO and the then CCO. The company's steps to encourage the circumvention of its controls further reflect its knowledge of the applicability of U.S. sanctions to its conduct.
  • Based on the large number of U.S. users on Binance.com and the liquidity they provided for its global trading activity, Binance knew, or had reason to know, its matching engines were routinely matching U.S. users with users from sanctioned jurisdictions over many years and at significant volumes. Such matches were inevitable in light of the trading volumes at issue, and Binance personnel were aware of the presence of each group and their trading activities on the exchange.
  • Despite awareness of Binance's failure to implement sufficient controls, Binance senior management mischaracterized its sanctions controls and its commitment to compliance to third parties in private communications, and to the public through actions such as issuing misleading Terms of Use and by removing references to sanctioned countries from its website when, in fact, it continued to serve them. It also encouraged the use of VPNs and surreptitiously allowed U.S. users and sanctioned jurisdiction users to trade even after ostensibly blocking them.
  • Binance provided economic benefit to a substantial number of persons located in sanctioned jurisdictions over the course of at least four years. Its platform provided a way to hold and transfer virtual currency and other valuable assets, enabling the benefits of global trading and other financial activity to be received in sanctioned jurisdictions in direct contravention of the objectives underlying multiple U.S. sanctions programs. Such a channel also provided an avenue for at least two blocked persons to access the global cryptocurrency market.
  • Binance was a commercially sophisticated actor during the time of the Apparent Violations, entering new jurisdictions within months of its founding and quickly establishing operations throughout the world, including in the Cayman Islands, Singapore, and over time approximately 30 different countries. Binance grew quickly since its launch in July 2017 to become the world's largest virtual currency exchange by trading volume with almost 8 million global users by March 2018.

Mitigating Factors

  • OFAC has not issued Binance a Penalty Notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the date of the earliest transaction giving rise to the Apparent Violations.
  • Binance provided substantial cooperation to OFAC, including by conducting an extensive, independent, internal investigation, responding promptly to OFAC's requests for information, providing large volumes of data regarding the Apparent Violations, making multiple presentations to OFAC, submitting inculpatory internal communications, and executing a statute of limitations tolling agreement.
  • OFAC considered the totality of the unique circumstances of this matter to ensure that the enforcement response is proportionate to the nature of the Apparent Violations, including the volume of violative conduct compared to Binance's overall activity and its relative revenues and profits with respect to the trades underlying the Apparent Violations. Trades between users in the United States and sanctioned jurisdictions represented less than 0.0028% of Binance's total trading volume during the relevant time period. Its operating income from such transactions was estimated to be in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars.
  • Binance has implemented significant remedial measures, including: revamped compliance policies and procedures, such as the Binance Sanctions Manual requiring an annual enterprise-wide risk assessment and additional due diligence reviews of users suspected of being located in a sanctioned jurisdiction; required all users to pass KYC and implemented periodic customer reviews according to compliance risk ratings; engaged third-party vendors to detect and prevent blocked persons from onboarding and implemented IP blocking, geo-fencing, and blockchain monitoring; partnered with third-party companies to implement real-time transaction monitoring including screening for sanctioned parties; mandated sanctions training at initial onboarding and for all employees yearly at a minimum; significantly increased line-level compliance resources; created two teams dedicated to cooperation with law enforcement; remodeled compliance program governance and organization structure, including by hiring new compliance leadership with professional compliance experience in the financial sector and law enforcement; and conducted multiple lookback reviews of users to identify and offboard users from the United States and sanctioned jurisdictions.
  • Binance agreed to undertake certain compliance commitments, including retaining a Monitor for five years. The Monitor will review and evaluate the effectiveness of Binance's policies, procedures, and internal controls as they relate to Binance's current and ongoing compliance with U.S. sanctions laws, and make recommendations reasonably designed to improve the effectiveness of Binance's sanctions compliance program.
  • OFAC's settlement with Binance is part of a comprehensive settlement with DOJ, FinCEN, and the CFTC, pursuant to which Binance has undertaken to pay substantial additional penalties and undertake other significant remedial measures.

OFAC took this action concurrently with the Department of Justice, FinCEN, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. As part of a global resolution, Binance entered into separate settlements with each agency. Binance's obligation to pay $898,618,825 of the $968,618,825 OFAC settlement amount shall be deemed satisfied by its payment to DOJ for ITSR violations arising out of the same pattern of conduct during the same period of time. Pursuant to the comprehensive settlement, Binance also undertook to pay substantial additional penalties to FinCEN and the CFTC and to undertake other significant remedial measures.

Compliance Takeaways

OFAC's Sanctions Compliance for the Virtual Currency Industry establishes management commitment as the first pillar of an effective, risk-based compliance program. This commitment should come from the top and begin on "Day One," even as a company may still be establishing itself and developing its technologies and offerings. Such a commitment should be backed by resources adequate to address a company's risks. Compliance personnel must be empowered and receive the backing and authority necessary to effectively fulfill their function. A culture of compliance, where senior management is invested in and supports an organization's program and allows it to operate effectively and without undue interference, is essential to avoid committing violations of OFAC sanctions.

Compliance controls should also be incorporated into a company's platforms and systems, through KYC protocols, transaction monitoring, sanctions screening, algorithmic configurations, and other controls as appropriate. It is no defense that an algorithm or other "autonomous" system or formula serves as the mechanism for the underlying transactions or activities that violate sanctions; companies are responsible for the operation and consequences of the technologies they employ and will be held accountable where their technologies result in violations.

Virtual currency exchanges based outside the United States that conduct business with U.S. persons or within the United States must take care that their activities do not cause U.S. persons to violate U.S. economic sanctions or result in the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of goods, services, or technology from the United States to sanctioned jurisdictions or blocked persons. Foreign entities that conduct business in the United States or with U.S. persons should not avail themselves of U.S. customers, goods, technology, and services, without instituting controls to maintain adherence to U.S. economic sanctions and other U.S. laws.

Official Source Documents

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Archived on June 13, 2026

SHA-256: 595e8cad2e0780b56698185f11f8fa3893049be0309b5840c5e6bd37a8d64eea

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