Branch Banking & Trust OFAC Settlement: $19.1K (2014)

On June 1, 2011, BB&T received instructions to process a $20,000 funds transfer on behalf of its customer, destined for a third-country company's account at a foreign financial institution. BB&T's interdiction software stopped the payment for review due to a name in the payment details that appeared to match an entry on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. During BB&T's investigation of the potential name match, the bank determined that the individual was a Sudanese national but failed to request additional information, such as a physical address. After determining that the name was not an SDN List match, a BB&T compliance specialist added a reference in the payment details that included, inter alia, "NATIONALITY: SUDANESE" and then approved the wire. When BB&T's interdiction software rescreened the transaction it failed to generate an alert because the software did not contain the word "Sudanese" (or other similar terms relating to OFAC-sanctioned countries such as "Burmese," "Cuban," or "Iranian"). After BB&T processed the transaction, the bank's customer notified it that the individual referenced in the payment details was located in Omdurman, Sudan, and that the payment was for merchandise being shipped to Sudan. The transaction constituted one apparent violation of § 538.205 of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 538.

OFAC determined that BB&T did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violation and that the apparent violation constituted a non-egregious case. The base penalty amount for the apparent violation was $25,000. The settlement amount of $19,125 reflects OFAC's consideration of the facts and circumstances pursuant to the General Factors under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A.

The case highlights a specific gap in BB&T's interdiction software: it did not contain the word "Sudanese" or other similar terms relating to OFAC-sanctioned countries — such as "Burmese," "Cuban," or "Iranian" — so when a compliance specialist added "NATIONALITY: SUDANESE" to the payment details, the software failed to generate an alert on rescan. The case also shows that during investigation of a potential SDN name match, compliance staff should request additional identifying information, such as a physical address, to determine whether a transaction implicates a sanctioned jurisdiction and not only whether the named individual appears on the SDN List.

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