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British Arab Commercial Bank plc OFAC Settlement: $4M

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British Arab Commercial Bank plc (BACB), a commercial bank located in the United Kingdom with no offices, business, or presence under U.S. jurisdiction, settled potential liability for 72 apparent violations of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations totaling $190,700,000 in transaction value. OFAC determined that BACB did not make a voluntary self-disclosure and that the apparent violations constitute an egregious case. BACB settled for $4,000,000, with its obligation to pay the remainder of the proposed penalty amount suspended.

Penalty Amount

$4,000,000.00

Enforcement Date

September 17, 2019

Rank in Top Penalties

#63

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
British Arab Commercial Bank plc
Country:
๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง United Kingdom
Industry:
Banking
Address:
London, United Kingdom
Penalty amount:
$4,000,000.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$381,400,000.00
Egregious case:
Yes
Apparent violations:
72
Voluntary self disclosure:
No
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
September 21, 2010 to August 27, 2014
Program:
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR) (previously found at 31 C.F.R. Part 538)
Enforcement date:
September 17, 2019

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Between September 21, 2010 and August 27, 2014, BACB processed 72 bulk funding payments totaling $190,700,000 related to Sudan, in apparent violation of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR) (previously found at 31 C.F.R. Part 538). During this period, BACB operated USD accounts on behalf of at least seven Sudanese financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Sudan, and actively solicited USD business from Sudanese banks.

BAะกB's mechanism involved two layers. BACB processed USD transactions for Sudanese parties via an internal book transfer process using a nostro account at a foreign bank โ€” a process that did not touch the U.S. financial system. However, to fund that nostro account, BACB routed large, periodic, USD-denominated wire transfers (bulk funding) from non-U.S. financial institutions in Europe, which then passed those USD transfers through banks in the United States for further credit to BACB's USD nostro account at a non-U.S. financial institution located in a country that imports Sudanese-origin oil. BACB had established this nostro account in 2006 explicitly to facilitate payments involving Sudan. Once funds arrived, BACB instructed the institution to process individual third-party payments to Sudanese parties, including Sudanese financial institutions.

OFAC's analysis confirmed a pattern in which the bulk funding transactions โ€” processed through the United States โ€” corresponded to the third-party payments, which were not processed through the United States. Several BACB employees, including managers and a member of the compliance team, were aware of this arrangement. They believed all Sudanese transactions would be processed outside the United States via European funding sources, and understood how the structure would attempt to circumvent U.S. sanctions regulations.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

BACB did not make a voluntary self-disclosure, and OFAC determined that the apparent violations constitute an egregious case. The total base penalty amount was $381,400,000. OFAC proposed a penalty of $228,840,000.

In consultation with BACB's domestic regulator, the United Kingdom's Prudential Regulation Authority, OFAC determined that the bank's operating capacity was such that it would face disproportionate impact if required to pay the proposed penalty. As a result, BACB will remit $4,000,000 to settle these potential violations, and its obligations to pay OFAC the remainder of the proposed penalty amount shall be suspended. The reduction reflects BACB's operating capacity, its representation that it ceased the described conduct, its entering into a settlement agreement, and its maintenance of the compliance commitments articulated in the settlement agreement.

Aggravating Factors

  • BACB appears to have demonstrated at least a reckless disregard for U.S. sanctions regulations when it employed a years-long practice of processing Sudan-related transactions through the United States in a manner that obfuscated the underlying purpose from U.S. financial institutions
  • BACB appears to have ignored warning signs that reasonably should have put the bank on notice that its conduct constituted a violation of U.S. law (for example, the bank's knowledge of U.S. authorities' sanctions-related enforcement actions involving other European banks engaging in similar conduct)
  • Several members of the bank's senior management were aware of and involved in the conduct giving rise to the apparent violations
  • BACB conferred substantial economic benefit to persons in Sudan and caused significant harm to the integrity of a U.S. sanctions program and its associated policy objectives by processing USD transactions to or through the United States in apparent violation of the SSR for a number of years
  • BACB is a commercially sophisticated financial institution

Mitigating Factors

  • OFAC has not issued BACB a Penalty Notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations
  • BACB provided significant investigative leads regarding the foreign financial institution that hosted the BACB nostro account
  • BACB fully cooperated with OFAC's investigation into these apparent violations, including by entering into a statute of limitations tolling agreement and agreeing to extend the agreement
  • BACB represented to OFAC that it does not have a strong financial position to withstand a substantial civil money penalty; OFAC determined, in consultation with BACB's local regulator, that BACB's operating capacity was such that the proposed penalty of $228,840,000 was inappropriate, and that the proposed civil monetary penalty of $4,000,000, while significant given the bank's operating capacity, was more appropriate
  • BACB represented to OFAC that it undertook several remedial measures in response to the apparent violations, including: exiting the Sudanese market in late 2014; hiring new senior management (including a new Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Risk Officer, Chief Controls Officer, Chief Compliance Officer, and in-house General Counsel); and implementing improvements to the compliance program, including by centralizing its team and updating its processes and procedures pertaining to Know Your Customer, anti-money laundering, and sanctions; BACB also agreed to undertake certain compliance commitments to ensure that its OFAC sanctions compliance program remains strong over the next several years

Compliance Takeaways

This enforcement action draws attention to, and highlights the risks surrounding, the use of complex payment structures, including bulk funding arrangements, to process payments on behalf of, or otherwise involving, U.S. sanctions targets. OFAC remains committed to ensuring that such structures do not represent an avenue for U.S. sanctions targets to access indirectly the U.S. financial system, realizing that bulk funding is an important part of correspondent banking practice.

Official Source Documents

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Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

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