SanctionsLookup

Data last synced:

CA Indosuez (Switzerland) S.A. OFAC Settlement: $720.3K

Last updated:

CA Indosuez (Switzerland) S.A. ("CAIS"), an indirect subsidiary of Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank (CACIB), settled its potential civil liability for apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, and Ukraine-related sanctions, agreeing to pay $720,258. For approximately three years, CAIS operated U.S. dollar (USD) banking and securities accounts on behalf of 17 individual customers located in sanctioned jurisdictions and conducted USD business on behalf of these customers through the U.S. financial system, including through U.S. correspondent banks and U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities. OFAC determined that CAIS's apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and constitute a non-egregious case.

Penalty Amount

$720,258.00

Enforcement Date

September 26, 2022

Rank in Top Penalties

#122

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
CA Indosuez (Switzerland) S.A.
Country:
🇨🇭 Switzerland
Industry:
Securities
Address:
Switzerland
Penalty amount:
$720,258.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$1,108,090.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$64,062,841.00
Egregious case:
No
Voluntary self disclosure:
Yes
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
April 2013 to April 2016
Program:
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201Ukraine-related, Section 1(a)(iii) of Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.203 and 204Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538.205Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR § 542.207
Enforcement date:
September 26, 2022

Nature of the Apparent Violations

CAIS served 17 individual clients located in Iran, Syria, Sudan, the Crimea region of Ukraine, and Cuba. Despite account holders' know-your-customer (KYC) files containing address information indicating their residence in sanctioned jurisdictions, CAIS allowed these customers to purchase securities issued by U.S. companies through U.S. broker-dealers and other U.S. market participants (240 transactions totaling $2,050,780), and to engage in 33 commercial transactions totaling approximately $1,025,400 through U.S. banking correspondents.

Although CASA and CACIB had implemented a global sanctions compliance program requiring subsidiaries to adhere to it, CAIS failed to fully implement it during the relevant period. CAIS failed to fully restrict USD-cleared payments related to the 17 personal accounts maintained for customers residing in sanctioned jurisdictions. In 2014, CAIS implemented internal restrictions for accounts held by persons ordinarily resident in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria; Crimea was added in 2015. However, CAIS later discovered that these restrictions did not prevent securities-related payments from being credited to the accounts, allowing customers in sanctioned jurisdictions to continue to purchase and sell securities through the U.S. financial system and to receive related dividend and interest payments until CAIS took further steps.

Between April 2013 and April 2016, CAIS processed 273 transactions totaling approximately $3,076,180 on behalf of individuals ordinarily resident in Cuba, Crimea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This conduct resulted in apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201; Section 1(a)(iii) of Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014; the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.203 and 204; the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538.205; and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 542.207.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $64,062,841. OFAC determined that CAIS self-disclosed the Apparent Violations and that the Apparent Violations constitute a non-egregious case. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A, the base civil monetary penalty amount for this matter equals the sum of one-half of the transaction value for each Apparent Violation, which is $1,108,090. The settlement amount of $720,258 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • Personnel at CAIS had reason to know they were processing transactions through the U.S. financial system for individual customers located in comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions based on the underlying KYC data obtained by CAIS, which included address information indicating the customers' location.
  • CAIS conferred approximately $3,076,180 in economic benefit to persons in Cuba, Crimea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria, thereby causing harm to the integrity of multiple sanctions programs and their associated policy objectives for approximately three years.

Mitigating Factors

  • CAIS has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the Apparent Violations.
  • CAIS undertook extensive remedial measures in response to the Apparent Violations, including: implementing CACIB's updated instructions requiring escalation for validation by CASA Financial Security of transactions in any currency involving a client residing or established in, or with beneficial owners residing in, certain countries; informing U.S. security custodians of customer accounts requiring restrictions; implementing a process to prevent all securities-related payments from being credited to the individual accounts of residents of comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions; implementing CASA's country risk control framework to identify high-risk countries and minimum supervisory measures; adopting CASA's procedures for the screening of customer databases; implementing SWIFT's Payment Data Quality tool, which verifies that SWIFT payment messages contain complete name, address, and account number information; and implementing a new commercial screening tool with an algorithm to perform, on an automated basis, daily screening of customers' country of permanent residence against sanctioned jurisdictions.
  • CAIS substantially cooperated during OFAC's investigation by voluntarily disclosing the Apparent Violations following an internal lookback conducted in response to a compliance-related audit, providing well-organized responses to OFAC's requests for information, and agreeing to toll the statute of limitations.

Compliance Takeaways

This case demonstrates the importance for foreign financial institutions, including those operating in the securities industry, to implement and maintain effective sanctions compliance controls, especially if their lines of business involve transactions transiting the U.S. financial system. Financial institutions that do business in multiple jurisdictions and across a number of product lines should ensure that their compliance controls are implemented consistently across relevant products and lines of business, where relevant on a risk basis. This case demonstrates how financial institutions can benefit from integrating KYC data into their sanctions screening platforms. This case also highlights the value of testing and auditing controls to identify sanctions compliance related problems, reporting them to OFAC, and proactively implementing appropriate remedial measures. This case emphasizes that global subsidiaries, when instructed to implement a parent company's compliance policies, should do so in a timely and effective manner.

Consistent with FAQ 335, OFAC encourages firms operating in the securities industry, including securities intermediaries and custodians, to implement measures that mitigate the risk of providing services to, or dealing in property in which there is an ownership or other interest of, parties subject to U.S. sanctions. Such measures should be tailored to and commensurate with the sanctions risk posed by a firm's business activities.

Official Source Documents

This page summarizes an OFAC enforcement case based on the document archived below. SanctionsLookup assumes no liability for errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in the original documents, this summary, or any changes made to the source documents at any time.

Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

SHA-256: 93281b2e694d2b373f237e28e0babcb0440412dea1a837485bbb6cd1e116296b

More OFAC Cases