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CFM Indosuez Wealth OFAC Settlement: $401K (2022)

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CFM Indosuez Wealth, an indirect subsidiary of Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank (CACIB), settled its potential civil liability for apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, agreeing to pay $401,039. CFM operated U.S. dollar banking and securities accounts on behalf of 11 individual customers located in sanctioned jurisdictions and conducted U.S. dollar business on behalf of these customers through the U.S. financial system, including through U.S. correspondent banks and U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities.

Penalty Amount

$401,039.00

Enforcement Date

September 26, 2022

Rank in Top Penalties

#157

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
CFM Indosuez Wealth
Country:
🇲🇨 Monaco
Industry:
Securities
Address:
Monaco
Penalty amount:
$401,039.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$616,983.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$106,853,346.00
Egregious case:
No
Voluntary self disclosure:
Yes
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
December 15, 2011 to July 1, 2016
Program:
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.203 and 204Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR § 542.207
Enforcement date:
September 26, 2022

Nature of the Apparent Violations

CFM is a financial institution based in Monaco that specializes in wealth management and corporate and investment banking. During the relevant period, CFM served 11 individual clients located in Iran, Syria, and Cuba, collecting account holders' KYC data, including address information indicating their location. Despite having this information, from December 2011 until July 2016, CFM allowed these customers to purchase securities issued by U.S. companies through U.S. broker-dealers and other U.S. market participants, in 410 transactions totaling $966,491. CFM also allowed these customers to engage in 16 commercial transactions totaling approximately $267,476 through U.S. banking correspondents.

Although CASA and CACIB had implemented a global sanctions compliance program requiring their subsidiaries to adhere to it, CFM did not fully implement it during the relevant period. CFM failed to fully restrict USD-cleared payments related to the 11 personal accounts maintained for customers residing in sanctioned jurisdictions. In 2015, CFM implemented internal restrictions aimed at preventing certain payments on those accounts, but later discovered that these restrictions did not prevent securities-related payments from being credited, allowing customers to continue to purchase and sell securities through the U.S. financial system and to receive related dividend and coupon payments until CFM took further steps.

Between December 15, 2011 and July 1, 2016, CFM processed 426 transactions totaling approximately $1,233,967 on behalf of individuals ordinarily resident in Cuba, Iran, and Syria, in apparent violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201, the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.203 and 204, and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 542.207.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $106,853,346. OFAC determined that CFM self-disclosed the Apparent Violations and that the Apparent Violations constitute a non-egregious case. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A, the base civil monetary penalty amount equals the sum of one-half of the transaction value for each apparent violation, which is $616,983. The settlement amount of $401,039 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • Personnel at CFM had reason to know they were processing transactions through the U.S. financial system for individual customers located in comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions based on the underlying KYC data CFM obtained, which included address information indicating the customers' location.
  • CFM conferred approximately $1,233,967 in economic benefit to persons in Cuba, Iran, and Syria, thereby causing harm to the integrity of multiple sanctions programs and their associated policy objectives for approximately five years.

Mitigating Factors

  • CFM has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the Apparent Violations.
  • CFM has represented that it undertook extensive remedial measures in response to the Apparent Violations, including: implemented CACIB's updated instructions requiring escalation for validation by CASA Financial Security of transactions in any currency involving a client residing or established in, or with beneficial owners residing in, certain countries, including Cuba, Iran, or Syria; implemented a process to prevent all securities-related payments from being credited to the individual accounts of residents of comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions; implemented CASA's country risk control framework to identify high-risk countries and enhanced its procedures to monitor those accounts and mitigate its sanctions-related risks; adopted CASA's procedures for the screening of customer databases, which defined the minimum standards related to customer screening and outlined requirements for the frequency of screening and type of data screened; implemented SWIFT's Payment Data Quality tool, which verifies that SWIFT payment messages contain the complete name, address, and account number information; and implemented a new commercial screening tool to screen customer information against OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, subsequently enhanced to include an algorithm to perform automated daily screening of customers' country of permanent residence against sanctioned jurisdictions.
  • CFM substantially cooperated during OFAC's investigation by voluntarily disclosing the Apparent Violations following an internal lookback conducted in response to a compliance-related audit, providing well-organized responses to OFAC's requests for information, and agreeing to toll the statute of limitations.

Compliance Takeaways

This case demonstrates the importance for foreign financial institutions, including those operating in the securities industry, to implement and maintain effective sanctions compliance controls, especially if their lines of business involve transactions transiting the U.S. financial system. Financial institutions that do business in multiple jurisdictions and across a number of product lines should ensure that compliance controls are implemented consistently across relevant products and lines of business, where relevant on a risk basis. This case also demonstrates how financial institutions can benefit from integrating KYC data into their sanctions screening platforms, and highlights the value of testing and auditing controls to identify sanctions compliance related problems, reporting them to OFAC, and proactively implementing appropriate remedial measures. Global subsidiaries, when instructed to implement a parent company's compliance policies, should do so in a timely and effective manner.

Consistent with FAQ 335, OFAC encourages firms operating in the securities industry, including securities intermediaries and custodians, to implement measures that mitigate the risk of providing services to, or dealing in property in which there is an ownership or other interest of, parties subject to U.S. sanctions. Such measures should be tailored to and commensurate with the sanctions risk posed by a firm's business activities.

Official Source Documents

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Archived on June 13, 2026

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