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Comtech OFAC Settlement: $894.1K (2020)

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Comtech Telecommunications Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary Comtech EF Data Corp., which sell advanced communications systems, software, and services, settled apparent violations of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations for $894,111. The companies indirectly exported warrantied satellite equipment and facilitated services and training to a government-owned entity in Sudan, despite the Sudan sanctions program that prohibited such transactions at the time.

Penalty Amount

$894,111.00

Enforcement Date

September 17, 2020

Rank in Top Penalties

#110

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Comtech Telecommunications Corp. and Comtech EF Data Corp.
Country:
🇺🇸 United States
Industry:
Telecom
Address:
Melville, New York
Penalty amount:
$894,111.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$584,386.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$1,168,772.00
Egregious case:
Yes
Apparent violations:
4
Voluntary self disclosure:
Yes
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
June 25, 2014 to October 19, 2015
Program:
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 538 (SSR)
Enforcement date:
September 17, 2020

Nature of the Apparent Violations

From June 25, 2014 to October 19, 2015, Comtech and EF Data appear to have violated the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 538 (SSR), four times by indirectly exporting satellite equipment under warranty, facilitating ongoing telephone support, and facilitating training, all with knowledge that the ultimate end-user was the Sudan Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA).

In February 2014, EF Data and its wholly owned Montreal-based subsidiary Memotec, Inc. ("Memotec") prepared a price quote for satellite equipment, telephone support, and technical training for a Canadian satellite communications equipment manufacturer (the "Canadian Company"). The sales agreement listed Sudan as the ultimate destination and obligated Memotec to provide support and training in connection with the equipment.

Before shipping, multiple warning signs arose: EF Data's Credit Manager alerted senior managers to potential export issues tied to the Sudan end-user; a document from the Canadian Company confirmed that the ultimate consignee was SCAA; and EF Data's third-party compliance screening software flagged OFAC export restrictions for Sudan. Rather than halt the transaction, EF Data's former Director of Logistics and Export Compliance Official attempted to transfer EF Data's OFAC compliance obligations to the Canadian Company.

EF Data shipped the equipment in two shipments on June 25 and June 27, 2014. The Canadian Company integrated the satellite equipment into an Aeronautical V-SAT Network and shipped it to SCAA at the Khartoum Airport on July 31, 2014, for use at 14 locations in Sudan. From September 29 to October 2, 2014, Memotec trained seven SCAA employees on the equipment in Montreal.

After Comtech filed a voluntary self-disclosure with OFAC on October 24, 2014, EF Data applied for an OFAC license on November 18, 2014 to cover services for SCAA. Despite the pending application, Memotec continued providing telephone support through October 19, 2015. In March 2015, EF Data's former Director of Logistics and Export Compliance Official also approved a warranty request to loan and export four hardware units from the United States to the Canadian Company to resolve an SCAA hardware problem. OFAC denied EF Data's license application on March 13, 2016.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty was $1,168,772. OFAC determined that Comtech and EF Data voluntarily self-disclosed the Apparent Violations and that the Apparent Violations constitute an egregious case. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, the base civil monetary penalty was $584,386. The settlement amount of $894,111 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • EF Data demonstrated reckless disregard for U.S. sanctions requirements and failed to exercise a minimal degree of caution or care by approving warranty services for equipment provided to SCAA while an OFAC license application was pending (and ultimately denied).
  • EF Data failed to heed warning signs, such as an alert from its compliance screening software indicating that the sale of the satellite equipment could have led to the Apparent Violations, and proceeded with the transactions.
  • EF Data managers, including export compliance personnel, proceeded with the indirect exportation of goods and the facilitation of services despite having actual knowledge that the ultimate destination of the equipment was Sudan and that the final customer was SCAA.
  • EF Data's Apparent Violations allowed SCAA to access and utilize U.S.-origin satellite equipment and facilitated SCAA's access to training, warranty, and telephone support services, resulting in an economic benefit to the Government of Sudan.
  • Comtech, which operates through its subsidiary EF Data, is a sophisticated supplier with significant international operations, has multiple foreign subsidiaries, and has experience applying OFAC regulations to its business.
  • EF Data provided shifting explanations in response to OFAC subpoenas and a request for information, and its subpoena response included an internal email to Comtech and Memotec personnel that was manipulated by EF Data's former Director of Logistics and Export Compliance Official to omit certain relevant language, requiring OFAC to expend significant additional time and resources to build an accurate administrative record of the Apparent Violations.

Mitigating Factors

  • Comtech and EF Data have not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the transaction giving rise to the Apparent Violations.

Compliance Takeaways

This case highlights the importance not only of investing in adequate internal controls to identify, interdict, and escalate prohibited transactions, but also of developing internal checks and balances so individual employees are not able to override those controls and approve otherwise prohibited transactions. This case also demonstrates the risks of proceeding with transactions while a license application is pending with OFAC with respect to those transactions. Additionally, companies engaging in high-risk international transactions should understand their obligations under OFAC regulations and recognize that they cannot shift those obligations onto their foreign customers or counterparties.

Official Source Documents

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Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

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