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Deutsche Bank Trust Americas OFAC Settlement: $425.6K

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Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas settled apparent violations of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations and Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine," for $425,600. OFAC determined that DBTCA did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violations, and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case.

Penalty Amount

$425,600.00

Enforcement Date

September 9, 2020

Rank in Top Penalties

#151

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
Country:
🇺🇸 United States
Industry:
Banking
Address:
New York, New York
Penalty amount:
$425,600.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$640,000.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$18,003,601.00
Egregious case:
No
Voluntary self disclosure:
No
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
December 22, 2015 to December 30, 2015
Program:
Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 589 (URSR)Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine"
Enforcement date:
September 9, 2020

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Between December 22, 2015 and December 30, 2015, DBTCA processed 61 transactions totaling $276,742.90 destined for accounts with Open Joint Stock Company Krasnodar Regional Investment Bank (a.k.a. OAO Krayinvestbank; a.k.a. OJSC Krayinvestbank; collectively, Krayinvestbank), a financial institution on the SDN List, in apparent violation of E.O. 13685 of December 19, 2014, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine." Despite each payment containing Krayinvestbank's SWIFT Business Identifier Code (BIC) and an almost identical match to the bank's name and address, all of which were included on the SDN List at the time of designation, DBTCA processed the majority of the payments on a straight-through basis without manual intervention.

Two failures contributed to the processing of these transactions. Contrary to its internal procedures, DBTCA failed to include Krayinvestbank's SWIFT BIC as an identifier when it originally added the bank's information to its interdiction filter. In addition, at the time of the transactions, DBTCA's filter was calibrated in such a way that only a payment with an exact SDN List match would trigger manual review.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

For the E.O. 13685 component of the settlement, the statutory maximum civil monetary penalty is $18,003,601. OFAC determined that DBTCA did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violations, and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case. Accordingly, under the Enforcement Guidelines, the total base penalty amount for the apparent violations is $640,000. The settlement amount of $425,600, which together with the settlement amount for the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations component comprises the aggregate $583,100 settlement, reflects OFAC's consideration of relevant facts and circumstances pursuant to the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • DBTCA failed to comply with existing internal policies and procedures when it failed to upload the SWIFT BIC of an OFAC-designated bank into its interdiction software at the time of the bank's designation.
  • DBTCA should have known about the transactions at issue because each set of payment instructions contained the SWIFT BIC of the designated bank.
  • DBTCA undermined the integrity of the sanctions program at issue and caused harm to the sanctions program objectives by providing economic benefit to a designated bank.
  • DBTCA is a large and sophisticated financial institution.
  • DBTCA's past sanctions history includes a 2013 settlement with OFAC that involved almost identical conduct to the apparent violations in this case. Specifically, DBTCA settled potential liability for an apparent violation of a different sanctions program that arose from the bank's failure to include the BIC of a bank identified on the SDN List in its interdiction filter. In making its determination as to the appropriate enforcement response and amount of mitigation in that case, OFAC considered as a mitigating factor the fact that the bank "took appropriate remedial action" in response to the apparent violation.

Mitigating Factors

  • DBTCA does not appear to have acted with willful intent to violate U.S. sanctions law or with a reckless disregard for its U.S. sanctions obligations.
  • No DBTCA supervisory or managerial level staff appear to have been aware of the conduct giving rise to the apparent violations.
  • The apparent violations represent a small percentage of the large volume of transactions DBTCA processes annually.
  • In response to the apparent violations, DBTCA promptly implemented changes to its procedures for adding BICs to its interdiction filter.
  • DBTCA cooperated with OFAC's investigation of the apparent violations by providing well-organized and user-friendly information in a prompt manner.

Compliance Takeaways

As part of its settlement with OFAC, DBTCA has agreed to maintain robust compliance procedures by ensuring that its management team is committed to compliance; it conducts risk assessments in a manner, and with a frequency, that adequately account for potential risks; it implements internal controls that adequately address the results of its OFAC risk assessment and profile; and its OFAC-related training program provides adequate information and instruction to employees.

These enforcement actions highlight the risks associated with a U.S. person failing to take adequate steps to ensure that transactions being processed are compliant with U.S. economic sanctions laws, particularly in instances in which a U.S. person has actual knowledge or reason to know, prior to the transaction being effected, of an SDN's present, future, or contingent interest in a transaction. In particular, U.S. persons should take due caution in accepting the oral or written representations of non-accountholder parties to a transaction where it relates to potential involvement of an SDN.

Official Source Documents

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Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

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