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Toronto-Dominion Bank OFAC Settlement: $516.1K (2017)

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Toronto-Dominion Bank ("TD Bank"), a financial institution headquartered in Canada, settled its potential civil liability for 167 apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, agreeing to remit $516,105. Separately, OFAC issued a Finding of Violation to TD Bank — the parent company of wholly owned subsidiaries Internaxx Bank SA ("Internaxx") and TD Waterhouse Investment Services (Europe) Limited ("TDWIS") — for 3,491 violations of the same regulations.

Penalty Amount

$516,105.00

Enforcement Date

January 13, 2017

Rank in Top Penalties

#133

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Toronto-Dominion Bank
Country:
🇨🇦 Canada
Industry:
Banking
Address:
Toronto, Canada
Penalty amount:
$516,105.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$955,750.00
Egregious case:
No
Apparent violations:
167
Voluntary self disclosure:
Yes
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
August 7, 2007 to March 28, 2012
Program:
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (CACR)Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR)
Enforcement date:
January 13, 2017

Nature of the Apparent Violations

TD Bank's Global Trade Finance business, based in Montreal, Canada, engaged in trade finance transactions involving import-export letters of credit for Canadian customers that the bank failed to screen for any potential nexus to an OFAC-sanctioned country or entity prior to processing related transactions through the U.S. financial system. Three patterns gave rise to the 167 apparent violations covered by the settlement.

First, beginning as early as 2003 or 2004, TD Bank maintained accounts for a Canadian company owned by a Cuban company. TD Bank had reason to know about the customer's connections to Cuba through the company's ownership and business, as well as actual knowledge on the part of several employees and business lines as early as 2005 and 2006. Between August 14, 2007 and April 22, 2011, TD Bank processed 29 transactions totaling $1,156,181.37 to or through the United States in apparent violation of the CACR.

Second, TD Bank maintained accounts in Canada for a freight, cargo, and shipping business that a document available to the bank identified as a sales agent for an entity on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons located in Iran. Between December 1, 2008 and March 28, 2012, TD Bank processed 39 transactions totaling $515,071.20 to or through the United States on behalf of this customer in apparent violation of the ITSR.

Third, TD Bank maintained accounts for 62 Cuban nationals residing in Canada. Between August 7, 2007 and January 24, 2011, TD Bank processed 99 transactions totaling $459,341.62 to or through the United States on behalf of these customers in apparent violation of the CACR.

The conduct involved multiple business units throughout TD Bank's network outside the United States, including at times supervisory or management personnel, that had reason to know or actual knowledge of information regarding these customers' connections to OFAC-sanctioned jurisdictions or parties. The apparent violations appear to have occurred due to shortcomings in the bank's OFAC compliance policies, procedures, and program.

Separately, OFAC issued a Finding of Violation to TD Bank as parent of wholly owned subsidiaries Internaxx Bank SA and TD Waterhouse Investment Services (Europe) Limited for 3,491 violations of the CACR and ITSR.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

OFAC determined that TD Bank voluntarily self-disclosed the 167 apparent violations and that those apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case. The total base penalty amount for the apparent violations was $955,750. After considering aggravating and mitigating factors under the General Factors Affecting Administrative Action in OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A, OFAC agreed to a settlement amount of $516,105.

The separately issued Finding of Violation for 3,491 violations of the CACR and ITSR, covering conduct attributed to TD Bank's subsidiaries Internaxx Bank SA and TD Waterhouse Investment Services (Europe) Limited, did not carry a monetary penalty.

Aggravating Factors

  • Several employees within TD Bank (including those in its compliance unit and supervisory and management personnel) were aware that the bank processed USD transactions on behalf of a Cuban entity and were aware of a gap in the bank's procedures permitting such transactions to clear through the U.S. financial system in apparent violation of the CACR.
  • Various TD Bank personnel had reason to know of the conduct that led to the apparent violations due to documentation or information in the bank's possession regarding various clients' ties to, or locations in, countries subject to OFAC sanctions.
  • TD Bank is a large and sophisticated financial institution with a global presence.
  • TD Bank's compliance program does not appear to have had controls in place sufficient to identify and prevent the bank from processing transactions to, through, or within the United States that were for or on behalf of customers owned by entities located in, or that conducted business with, OFAC-sanctioned countries.

Mitigating Factors

  • No TD Bank managers or supervisors appear to have had actual knowledge regarding the conduct that led to the apparent violations involving Pars Marine or the eight Cuba-connected retail banking customers.
  • While the transactions involving the Cuba-connected customers constituted apparent violations of the CACR, the customers were eligible for specific licenses from OFAC to become unblocked Cuban nationals and were eventually covered by a general license published in January 2011.
  • TD Bank has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest dates of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations.
  • TD Bank undertook a robust remedial response, including by changing its policies and procedures as well as its compliance structure in response to the apparent violations.
  • TD Bank provided substantial cooperation to OFAC throughout its investigation by voluntarily self-disclosing the apparent violations, providing detailed and well-organized information in response to OFAC's requests, and signing a tolling agreement and multiple extensions to the agreement thereafter.

Compliance Takeaways

The case highlights gaps that can arise when a bank's compliance program lacks controls sufficient to identify transactions processed to, through, or within the United States on behalf of customers owned by entities in OFAC-sanctioned countries, or customers that conduct business with sanctioned parties. TD Bank's Global Trade Finance business failed to screen import-export letters of credit for any potential nexus to OFAC-sanctioned countries or entities before processing related transactions through the U.S. financial system.

The conduct also illustrates the risk when information regarding a customer's sanctions connections — held by individual employees, business lines, or available in bank documentation — is not systematically integrated into the compliance program. In this case, several employees and business lines had actual knowledge of customers' ties to Cuba as early as 2005 and 2006, and documentation available to the bank identified another customer as a sales agent for an SDN entity, yet the transactions continued.

TD Bank's voluntary self-disclosure, detailed cooperation, and remedial response — including changes to its policies, procedures, and compliance structure — were all credited as mitigating factors in reaching the final settlement amount.

Official Source Documents

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Archived on June 13, 2026

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