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Family International Realty LLC OFAC Settlement: $1.1M

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Family International Realty LLC and its natural U.S. person owner settled with OFAC for $1,076,923 related to 73 apparent violations of OFAC's Ukraine-/Russia-related sanctions. Between 2018 and 2023, the Company and its owner engaged in a willful scheme to evade OFAC sanctions by transferring nominal ownership of three luxury condominiums owned by two sanctioned Russian oligarchs, Valeri Abramov and Viktor Perevalov, to their non-sanctioned family members and to shell companies owned by those family members.

Penalty Amount

$1,076,923.00

Enforcement Date

January 16, 2025

Rank in Top Penalties

#103

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
Family International Realty LLC
Country:
๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ United States
Industry:
Real Estate
Address:
Miami, Florida
Penalty amount:
$1,076,923.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$30,080,709.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$30,080,709.00
Egregious case:
Yes
Apparent violations:
73
Voluntary self disclosure:
No
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
March 21, 2018 to March 29, 2023
Program:
Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions, Executive Order 13685
Enforcement date:
January 16, 2025

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Abramov and Perevalov were designated to the SDN List on January 26, 2018, pursuant to Executive Order 13685, for having acted for or on behalf of VAD, AO, a Russian construction company they co-founded that was hired to build transportation infrastructure for the so-called "Republic of Crimea." Prior to the designations, U.S. Person-1 had maintained longstanding financial ties to both men, including providing property management services for their South Florida condominiums, exercising power of attorney over Perevalov's bank account, and acting as the "care of" party for bank accounts jointly owned by Abramov and his spouse.

Hours after Abramov was designated, U.S. Person-1 warned Abramov via text message that "it will soon be forbidden to deal with you" while continuing to contact potential buyers. U.S. Person-1 and Abramov then arranged to deed Abramov's condominium, valued at over $1 million, to Abramov's spouse for $100 in consideration in June 2018. As U.S. Person-1 relayed to an interlocutor at the time: "Abramov understands that without this [plan], all his money and apartment will be taken away from him!" U.S. Person-1 subsequently facilitated the sale of the property to third parties in March 2019 for $1.2 million, with the Company earning a commission and reimbursement for expenses.

For Perevalov's two South Florida condominium units, U.S. Person-1 worked with a law firm to incorporate a Delaware shell company owned by one of Perevalov's non-sanctioned minor children and managed in part by U.S. Person-1. Perevalov and his spouse transferred nominal ownership of the two units to the shell company without consideration in June 2018. The Company and U.S. Person-1 then rented or attempted to rent the properties as luxury hotel rooms on 64 occasions between March 21, 2018, and March 29, 2023, generating or attempting to generate approximately $840,254 in rental revenue for the shell company, with the Company earning a commission on each completed transaction. The conduct resulted in 73 apparent violations of ยงยง 2(a), 5(a), and 6(a) of Executive Order 13685.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $30,080,709. OFAC determined that the Company and U.S. Person-1 did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violations and that the apparent violations constitute an egregious case. Accordingly, under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 CFR part 501, app. A, the base civil monetary penalty equals the statutory maximum of $30,080,709.

The Company and U.S. Person-1's obligation to pay $182,442 of the settlement amount shall be deemed satisfied up to an equal amount by their payment to the Department of Justice in satisfaction of any criminal forfeiture order imposed in connection with the conduct at issue. The total settlement amount of $1,076,923 reflects OFAC's consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.

Aggravating Factors

  • The Company and U.S. Person-1 executed a willful, sophisticated sanctions evasion scheme on behalf of two sanctioned oligarchs with knowledge that the underlying conduct constituted, or likely constituted, a violation of U.S. law.
  • The Company and U.S. Person-1 at all times had actual knowledge of the apparently violative conduct in which they were engaged; they also enlisted the help of others in furtherance of these efforts.
  • The Company and U.S. Person-1's scheme spanned more than five years and produced approximately $2.1 million in actual proceeds from dealings in blocked property for their purported owners, as well as a further $1.1 million in expected proceeds from attempted dealings in blocked property. The Company earned approximately $182,442 in commission and expense reimbursements from the dealings. The Company and U.S. Person-1 substantially undermined the objectives of OFAC's Ukraine-/Russia-related sanctions by helping two sanctioned oligarchs to blunt the impact of OFAC's designations and continue dealing in, and profiting from, their U.S. real property holdings.

Mitigating Factors

  • U.S. Person-1's settlement is part of a comprehensive resolution with both OFAC and the Department of Justice. As part of the resolution with the Department of Justice, U.S. Person-1 has pleaded guilty to a criminal charge relating to the same underlying conduct. The plea carries a statutory maximum sentence of five years in prison and a criminal forfeiture figure of $182,442.
  • The Company and U.S. Person-1 cooperated with OFAC to resolve this matter.
  • Based on the financial condition of the Company and U.S. Person-1, OFAC determined mitigation from the base penalty to be warranted.

U.S. Person-1 resolved criminal charges with the Department of Justice related to a subset of the apparent violations as part of a comprehensive resolution alongside the OFAC settlement. U.S. Person-1 pleaded guilty to a criminal charge relating to the same underlying conduct, carrying a statutory maximum sentence of five years in prison and a criminal forfeiture figure of $182,442. The Company and U.S. Person-1's obligation to pay $182,442 of the OFAC settlement amount shall be deemed satisfied up to an equal amount by their payment to the Department of Justice in satisfaction of any criminal forfeiture order imposed in connection with the conduct at issue.

Compliance Takeaways

This case highlights the role that gatekeepers, including realtors, investment advisers, attorneys, and trust and corporate services providers, can play in enabling sanctions evasion. These professionals possess unique expertise and technical know-how that enables them to provide critical business services, but those services can also be misused to conceal a sanctioned party's interest or evade sanctions compliance controls. In doing so, gatekeepers not only risk violating sanctions themselves, but also expose others to liability. Financial institutions that deal with gatekeepers should conduct sufficient due diligence to ensure that gatekeepers are not acting as proxies for sanctioned parties, and should apply heightened scrutiny when a gatekeeper may represent or purport to represent a close family member, agent, or associate of a sanctioned person.

This action also underscores the sanctions risks associated with commercial or residential real estate transactions. FinCEN and the multilateral Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force have published alerts including specific red flags associated with sanctions evasion, several of which were present in this case. FinCEN announced in August 2024 a final rule designed to combat and deter money laundering by increasing transparency in the U.S. residential real estate sector, effective December 1, 2025.

Lastly, this case demonstrates that the property interests of blocked persons are generally not extinguished by sham transfers of title or surreptitious efforts to obscure their connection. The broad definition of "property interest" under OFAC's regulations may result in the blocking of a wide range of SDN-controlled property. OFAC's regulations generally provide that sham transfers of title and similar attempts are null and void and without legal effect. Parties who attempt to evade OFAC sanctions through post-designation arrangements, including by substituting family members or third parties as the owners of property in which blocked persons retain an interest, may find their efforts futile.

Official Source Documents

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Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

SHA-256: baf2023f7774a5a207167699e50e37dacfe4f342c89c63b78a6d223303be0761

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