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CSE Global & TransTel OFAC Settlement: $12M (2017)

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CSE Global Limited and CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd. settled potential civil liability for 104 apparent violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd. ("TransTel"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of CSE Global Limited, agreed to pay $12,027,066 to resolve conduct in which TransTel caused at least six separate financial institutions to engage in the unauthorized exportation or re-exportation of financial services from the United States to Iran.

Penalty Amount

$12,027,066.00

Enforcement Date

July 27, 2017

Rank in Top Penalties

#32

Case Details

Type:
Entity
Name:
CSE Global Limited and CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd.
Country:
🇸🇬 Singapore
Industry:
Telecom
Address:
Singapore
Penalty amount:
$12,027,066.00
Base civil monetary penalty:
$38,181,161.00
Max civil monetary penalty:
$38,181,161.00
Egregious case:
Yes
Apparent violations:
104
Voluntary self disclosure:
No
Case:
Settlement
Violation period:
June 4, 2012 to March 27, 2013
Program:
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR)
Enforcement date:
July 27, 2017

Nature of the Apparent Violations

Between August 25, 2010 and November 5, 2011, TransTel entered into contracts with, and received purchase orders from, multiple Iranian companies to deliver and install telecommunications equipment for several energy projects in Iran and/or Iranian territorial waters. TransTel hired a number of different third-party vendors, including several Iranian companies, to provide goods and services on its behalf in connection with those contracts and purchase orders.

Prior and subsequent to entering into those contracts, CSE Global and TransTel separately maintained individual U.S. Dollar (USD) and Singaporean Dollar accounts with a non-U.S. financial institution in Singapore (the "Bank"). In a letter entitled "Sanctions – Letter of Undertaking," dated April 20, 2012 and signed by TransTel's then-Managing Director and CSE Global's then-Group Chief Executive Officer, TransTel stated to the Bank: "In consideration of [the Bank] agreeing to continue providing banking services in Singapore to our company, we, CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd … hereby undertake not to route any transactions related to Iran through [the Bank], whether in Singapore or elsewhere."

Despite this written attestation, TransTel appears to have begun originating USD funds transfers from its USD-denominated account with the Bank related to its Iranian business beginning no later than June 2012, less than two months after the Letter of Undertaking was signed. From on or about June 4, 2012 to on or about March 27, 2013, TransTel appears to have violated § 1705 (a) of IEEPA and/or § 560.203 of the ITSR when it originated 104 USD wire transfers totaling more than $11,111,000 involving Iran. TransTel initiated the wire transfers from its account with the Bank. The transactions were destined for multiple third-party vendors (including several Iranian parties) that supplied goods or services to or for the energy projects in Iran, and all of the funds transfers were processed through the United States. None of the transactions contained references to Iran, the Iranian projects, or any Iranian parties. This conduct caused at least six separate financial institutions to engage in the unauthorized exportation or re-exportation of financial services from the United States to Iran, a prohibition of § 560.204 of the ITSR.

How OFAC Determined the Penalty

OFAC determined that TransTel did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violations, and that the apparent violations constitute an egregious case. Both the statutory maximum and base civil monetary penalty amounts for the apparent violations were $38,181,161. The settlement amount of $12,027,066 reflects OFAC's consideration of the facts and circumstances pursuant to the General Factors under OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A.

Aggravating Factors

  • TransTel willfully and recklessly caused apparent violations of U.S. economic sanctions by engaging in, and systematically obfuscating, conduct it knew to be prohibited, including by materially misrepresenting to its bank that it would not route Iran-related business through the bank's branch in Singapore or elsewhere, and by engaging in a pattern or practice that lasted for 10 months
  • TransTel's then-senior management had actual knowledge of and played an active role in the conduct underlying the apparent violations
  • TransTel's actions conveyed significant economic benefit to Iran and/or persons on OFAC's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons by processing dozens of transactions through the U.S. financial system that totaled $11,111,812 and benefited Iran's oil, gas, and power industries
  • TransTel is a commercially sophisticated company that engages in business in multiple countries

Mitigating Factors

  • TransTel has not received a penalty notice, Finding of Violation, or cautionary letter from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the earliest transaction giving rise to the apparent violations
  • TransTel and CSE Global have undertaken remedial steps to ensure compliance with U.S. sanctions programs
  • TransTel and CSE Global provided substantial cooperation during the course of OFAC's investigation, including by submitting detailed information to OFAC in an organized manner, and responding to several inquiries in a complete and timely fashion

Compliance Takeaways

This enforcement action highlights the sanctions compliance obligations of all individuals and entities that conduct business in OFAC-sanctioned jurisdictions or with OFAC-sanctioned parties and that also process transactions directly or indirectly through the United States, or involving U.S. companies, or U.S.-origin goods, services, and technology. When signing letters of attestation or making other representations and warrantees to financial institutions that provide access to the U.S. financial system, individuals and entities should consider carefully whether they are willing and able to act within the parameters of such agreements.

Official Source Documents

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Provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always consult the source document directly rather than relying on this summary.

Archived on June 13, 2026

SHA-256: e40f08482668b3a855a961e14940e85c1e1474a1d671d2686a20216b7823bd0e

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